MacIntyre, Heidegger and the Boot-strapping Problem
In attempting to construct a functioning luthier workshop from scratch—a solitary, mid-life creatio ex nihilo armed with a single garage, a smartphone, and YouTube—I have run headlong into what I call the 'bootstrapping problem': fashioning each individual part turns out to require an already functioning, competent whole. Reflecting on this paralysis this mornng, I realized that my frustration is not just a logistical mess. It is an acute, lived example of what the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre might have construed as the trap of the atomized will.
Modern people are prone to understand the world as mobile, 'billiard ball' individuals -- rational, transacting, decision makers; sovereign agents in charge of their own destiny. This is a very modern way of understanding the self that only became possible as the economic maelstrom of modernization pulled people out of tight-knit, place-bound and intergenerational families and communities, and sent them pell-mell into the anonymous and endlessly mobile 'shock cities' immortalized by historians and commentators such as Asa Briggs, Engels and De Toqueville. Karl Polanyi characterized the entire project of modernity as 'disembedding'.
And therein lies my problem. Traditional craftwork was embedded into the tissue of that kind of place-bound community. Like Rodin's thinking statue always associated with Descartes aphorism 'I think therefore I am', modern crafters are forced to think there way into existence.
Thinking back to Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue (1983), I see my predicament exposed in a new way. I am the quintessential modern liberal individual trying to substitute private consumption and isolated willpower for a living moral tradition.
In the immortal words of Blackadder, 'Bugger'! This is not going to make things easy.
Internal vs. External Goods:
MacIntyre distinguishes between goods external to an activity (status, quick results, acquiring impressive toys) and goods internal to a practice (the quiet excellence, discipline, and aesthetic judgment that can only be defined from within the craft itself). My natural "route one" football temperament—bashing the ball into the box, chasing the fastest, ugliest route to a functional result—is entirely oriented toward external goods. I bought a high-spec DeWalt sliding miter saw because I am a modern bloke seduced by the gear. Lutherie, however, is an ancient practice. It demands that I subordinate my impatient ego to its internal goods: learning to savor the cut of a plane, honoring the grain of spruce, and accepting that my character must be painfully refashioned before a decent instrument can emerge.
The Absence of Tradition and Authority:
MacIntyre argues that one cannot simply enter a practice as a self-sufficient sovereign. Rather one must humbly submit to the authority of a shared tradition. This is why the story of Omobono Stradivari came to mind. Famous as an under-performer, Omo was in fact highly competent by the virtue ethical and communitarian standards of the prior age. It was in the role of modern individual genius -- a role for which his father Antonio wrote the manual -- that he came in second.
The kind of social and communitarian competence that Omo did achieve wasn't a product of heroic and idiosyncratic will. And clearly he did not achieve competence by downloading specs or bingeing video tutorials. Rather he was immersed in the old-world of multigenerational guild of masters, journeymen, and kin. His understanding was held in trust by a living community.
My situation is rather different. I sit marooned in my leaky, wonky garage trying to reverse engineer a tradition from disembodied, informational fragments on the internet. Without an embodied lineage to submit to, my quest for mastery is constantly sabotaged by my own congealed, impatient habits.
And there is another philosopher who came to mind. In Being and Time, Heidegger views craft work not as mere manual labor, but as the foundational way human beings (Dasein) genuinely encounter and make sense of reality. Like Macintyre, Heidegger rejects the modern Cartesian philosophical view of humans as detached minds observing inert physical objects. He uses the workshop to demonstrate that our primary relationship to the world is practical and engaged: a skilled artisan does not theoretically analyze a hammer’s mass or dimensions, but wields it smoothly within an interconnected web of materials, purposes, and bodily habits. In this absorbed flow of work, the tool becomes 'ready-to-hand' (zuhanden)—virtually transparent as it merges into the task—revealing that the world is inherently a structure of functional meaning long before it is ever reduced to abstract, theoretical contemplation.
The Totality of Equipment (Bewandtnisganzheit):
For Heidegger, Bewandtnisganzheit ('the totality of involvements' or 'totality of equipment') refers to the interconnected network of practical relations within which any tool or object has meaning. A hammer, for example, is not encountered as an isolated thing but as something for driving nails, which are for joining boards, which are for building a house, which serves broader human purposes and projects. Every item of equipment derives its significance from its place within this larger web of references, and it is through such a web that a meaningful world is disclosed to us. Rather than first perceiving detached objects and then assigning them functions, Heidegger argues that we are always already immersed in a practical world where things show up in terms of what they are for.
The Bewandtnisganzheit is therefore the background whole of purposes, practices, tools, materials, and human concerns that makes any particular thing intelligible in the first place. No tool ever exists in isolation. A tool only makes sense within a prior, holistic referential context: the hammer refers to the nail, the nail to the timber, the timber to the room, the room to the craft. My bootstrapping dilemma is the phenomenological tragedy of trying to introduce tools before an interconnected world exists for them.
I bought a heavy, unwieldy 1960s Beaver table saw without the floor space to feed an 8x4 sheet. Needing to equip an entire craft system (a whole), I hit the auctions. But without the guiding vector of the whole system and not having internalized the generational experience of the craft, the bits and pieces I acquire (the parts) have a random quality. There is no guarantee that they will cohere. Because the whole does not yet exist, the parts cannot function. They are orphaned objects cluttering my floor rather than an organic network of work.
Ready-to-Hand (Zuhandenheit) vs. Present-at-Hand (Vorhandenheit):
In a master craftsman’s hands, a tool is ready-to-hand; it becomes transparent, an unthinking extension of the body absorbed in flow. But in my garage, everything is in perpetual breakdown. The 1-inch steel bar seizes on the bearing; the floor slopes away drunkenly; the circular saw wavers along an improvised 2x4 straight edge. The moment a tool fails or resists, it shifts from an intuitive extension of myself into a stubborn, obtrusive, present-at-hand problem. I cannot enter the zone of making because I am constantly forced to stop, curse, grab a grinder, and bludgeon recalcitrant physical matter into submission.
The Illusion of Gestell:
In my reliance on PowerPoint designs and curated video hacks, I fell into what Heidegger called Gestell (enframing)—the modern delusion that the world is merely an inventory of resources to be mathematically planned and conquered. My garage rapidly disabused me of that conceit. Real craft is not technical optimization imposed from a laptop screen; it is poiesis, an attuned dwelling that listens patiently to the resistance of the wood and the limits of the room.
Conclusion
My yearning for an "Artisan Tardis"—a time machine to leapfrog three years of waste and blunders—is ultimately a fantasy of skipping the suffering of formation:
MacIntyre reminds me that I cannot purchase or engineer my way out of moral apprenticeship. My deepest obstacle is not the lack of a job-site saw, but my own stubborn character, which must learn the ascetic virtue of submitting to the slow disciplines of the craft.
Heidegger shows me that a true workshop cannot be assembled like flat-pack furniture from an inventory list. It must be slowly, patiently disclosed as my body, my tools, and this imperfect, sloped concrete space gradually learn to indwell each other.



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